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A. D. SELLARS and MARIE L. SELLARS,
his wife,
Cross-complainants,
vs.
WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTH E.
BLOMQUIST, his wife,
Cross-defendants.

Case No.
11631

RESPONDENT'S AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN SAVIN GS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTH E.
BLOMQUIST, his wife, WILLIAM G. FOWLER, Trustee of the Estate of GUARANTY
TRUST DEED CORPORATION, a corporation, and A. D. Sellars and MRS. A. D. SELLARS, his wife,
Defendants,
A. D. SELLARS and MARIE L. SELLARS,
his wife,
Cross-complainants,
vs.
WAYNE T. BLOMQUIST and RUTH E.
BLOMQUIST, his wife,
Cross-defendants.

Case No.
11631

RESPONDENT'S AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

srrATEMEN'T OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for damages suffered by vendees
who purchased property under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract from vendors then in default on their mortgage,
'vho concealed such defa ult from the vendees, and who
suffered the mortgagee to foreclose the vendors' mortgage.

2

DISPOSITION IN LOW'ER COURT
American Savings & Loan Association, the mortgagor, was granted sununary judgment foreclosing
appellants' mortgage. The court concluded that appellants (Blomquist) were in default, and that respondents
(Sellars) were in default for failure to make certain
payments on the Uniform Estate Contract. For that
reason, the court concluded that neither party had a
cause of action against the other and dismissed their
respective claims.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents (Sellars) seek reversal of the judgment
of dismissal of their claim against appellants (Blomquist).

Appellants (Blomquist) and respondents (Sellars)
contracted for the sale and purchase of certain real
property pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
(R. 26, 27; F.F. 2, R. 168) At the time of the contract
appellants (Blomquist) were in default to American
Savings & Loan Association on their mortgage, as determined by adjudication and judgment in favor of
American Savings & Loan Association. (R. 81, No. 21;
R. 90, No. 21; R. 2, No. 3; F.F. 3, R. 168).
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Respondents (Sellars) had made regular monthly
payments in accordance with the terms of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract until they were served with a
Hummons and Complaint in the foreclosure action
brought by American 8avings & Loan Association, at
which time they discontinued regular payments and commenced payments only upon appointment of a receiver,
thereafter, making regular payments directly to the receiver. (F.F. No. ±, R. 168; R. 187) Respondents (Sellars) were served with American Savings & Loan Assoeiation's Summons and Complaint on February 16, 1967
whereby they first learned of appellants' (Blomquist)
<lefault on th('
\\'ith American Savings & Loan
Association and concomitant breach of the terms of
Paragraph No. 11 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract
(R. 6±; R. 2, .N"o. 3, and R. 3, No. 4: R. 26, No. 11) On
}farch S, 1967, respondents (Sellars) filed a third party
eomplaint against appellants (Blomquist) for default on
tlw eniform RPal Estate Contract resulting from appellants (Blomquist) failure to mab• their payments on the
mortgage. Respondents' (Rellars) third party complaint
was subse<pwntly dismissed without prrjudice. (R. 28-30;
H. 56) On :\fay .+, 1967 respond<mts (Sellars) filed a

<·ross eomplaint against appellants

(Blomquist) for

breach of the rniform Real Estate Contract (R. GO, 61).
App<>llants (Blomquist) subsPquPntly, on

22, 1967,

anS\\'<'r<>d respon<1Pnts' (Sellars) cross complaint, and
e ross counkr-ela inwcl to for<>e1ose the Uniform Real

EstatP Contraet as a

(R. 7 4-77)
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On May 9, 19G7, American Savings & Loan Association moved for appojntment of a receiver for rents on
the property, which motion was apparently not pursued.
A receiver was appointed November 14, 1967, pursuant
to a subsequent motion by appellants (Blomquist) for
appointment of a receiver which was filed on October
26, 1967, and American Savings & Loan Association's
joinder in appellants' (Blomquist) motion for appointment of a receiver dated October 27, 1967. (R,. 71-73;
R. 9-±, 95; R. 92, 93; R. 9(), 97) Respondents (Sellars)
then conunenced making monthly payments to the receiver (F.F. No. 4, R. 168) On October 30, 1968, the
court granted the motion of American Savings & Loan
Association for summary judgment and decree of foreclosure, foreclosing appellants' (Blomquist) rights in
the property and decreeing respondents' (Sellars) claim
to be subject to, subordinate and inferior to American
Savings & Loan Association's mortgage lien. (R. 140,
No. 4; R. 141; F.F. No. 1, R. 168) On May 1. 1968, the
statutory period during which appellants (Blomquist)
might have redeemed the property expired.
On January 3, 1969, respondents' (Sellars) claim
against appellants (Blomquist) came on for trial before
the honorable Marcellus K. Snow. (R. 167) The parties
were prepared to testify with respect to the various
issues in the case, but upon consultation between the
court and counsel, certain facts were stipulated to by the
parties and subsequently adopted by the court as its
findings of fact:
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"l. That a judgment was entered on October
30, 1968, in favor of the plajntiff, American Savings and Loan Association, and against all defendants, declaring the plaintiff's trust deed to
be a first trust deed and declaring all defendants'
interests to he inferior in interest thereto; and
further, foreclosing the said trust deed and note
supporting said trust deed as against vVayne T.
Blomquist, Ruth E. Blomquist, and other defendants; and for an order allowing the plaintiff a
deficiency judginPnt on the notes against the defendants, vVayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blomquist; and that no appeal has been filed from
said judgment.

2. That on the Gth day of December, 1965,
Wayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blomquist en-·
tered jnto a Uniform Real Estate Contract with
A. D. Sellars and l\Iarie L. Sellars, the form of
which contract was agreed to by the parties and
their counsel at the time of trial, a copy of which
was prt-scnted at that time and agreed to by
counsel as bejng a copy of thP contract ht-tween
the parbes.
3. That at the timP the parties entered into
the Fniform Real Estate Contract, the Blomquists were in thP fact position which was the
hasis of the plaintiff's, American Savings & Loan
Association, cause of action and were the facts
which supported the theory upon which the judgnwnt of Octolwr 30th, 1968, rested.

4-. rr1w S(>llars COlllllH'nced makjng monthly
pay:nwnts and had made regular monthly pa?'ments nnti1 Hwy wert> sprved wHh a summons rn
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the above entitled action, at which time they discontinued regular payments and commenced payments only upon the appointment of a receiver,
and paid the amount presently in the possession
of the said receiver.
5. There is presently on hand in the possession of the reeciver, the amount of
6. A judgment of foreclosure was entered
on the 30th day of October, 1968, and a foreclosure
sale was set for January 7th, 1969, at the hour of
12 :00 noon." (R. 168)
The court concluded from the facts stipulated to, that the
appellants (Blomquist) were in default to American Savings & Loan Association at the time they entered into
the contract with the respondents (Sellars), and "were
subsequently foreclosed and precluded from any further
inteerst therein for the reason that the provisions in the
contract were dependent and could not be enforced while
in default and that the said appellants (Blomquists)
were not entitled to foreclose the title to property they
had been previously foreclosed out of themselves." (C.L.
No. 4, R. 169)
The court rendered judgment the 5th day of March,
1969, dismissing appellants' claim against respondents
for failure to state a cause of action and dismissing respondents' claim against appellants for failure to state
cause of action. (R. 172)
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT FORECLOSE
RESPONDENTS' TITLE TO THE PROPERTY FOR
THE REASON THAT APPELLANTS WERE IN DEFAULT OF THE CONTRACT AT THE TIME THEY
ENTERED INTO IT.

Appellants were ·wilfully in default on the Uniform
Heal Estate 'Contract at the very instant they set their
pens to the paper. Paragraph No. 11 of the Uniform
Real Estate Contract prepared by appellants own hand
]Jrovidt's that:
"The seller hereby covenants and agrees that
there are no assessments against said premises
except the fallowing: "None" (typed into the
printed form)
The seller further covenants and agrees that
he will not default in the payment of his obligation against the said property." (R. 26)

By their own admission respondents knew that they had
been in default of their mortgage with American Savings & Loan Association, since at least October 15, 1964.
(R. 81, No. 21; R. 90, No. 21) This court has followed
the rule that a vendee can not attack a vendor's title
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in advance of tender of the final payment. Woodward v.
Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953); Leavitt v. Blohrn,
11 U.2d 220, 357 P .2d 190 (1960). In W oodioar.d v. Allen,
supra,, the defendant signed an agreement with the plaintiff for the purchase of real property on one evening,
delivering a $500.00 check as down payment, then stopped
payment on foe check the next morning. Defendant
attempted to justify this action on the basis of certain
quiet title suits prosecuted by the county to resolve all
doubt as to the validity of certain tax deeds, which were
links in the chain of title to the property.
The court noted that it believed that "defendants'
objections were received after the stop payment and
were designed to avoid a bargain regretted,'' and that
under the facts of the case, "plaintiffs were not obliged
to prove marketable title simply because defendant
raised the point." The facts of this case clearly support
the court in its conclusion that, "defendants' attack on
the marketability of plaintiffs' title was premature."
Its judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling specific
performance on the contract, is a remedy such as could
not be rendered in this case, since plaintiff has no title
to convey in any event. The court in Leavitt v. Blohrn,
supra, agreed that "the purchaser can not use a claimed
deficiency in title as an excuse for refusing to keep a
commitment to purchase property, as was attempted in
the case of Woodward v. Allen" (emphasis supplied by
the court. The court distinguished the case before them
from the Woodward case. "vV e see no impropriety in
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the trial eourt's view that where the [plaintiffs] had
permitted their interest in the property to become involved in such a way that the buyer did not have the
quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it, coupled with the
further fact that the circumstances justified forebodings
that they would not be able to extricate themselves from
their difficulty and be in a position to convey title, [defendant] was not obliged to continue payments, but
c-ould take such measures as seemed necessary and prudent to protect herself." The facts of the Leavitt case,
which the court here n•garded as distinguishable from
1Voodward, ·were briefly, that defendant contracted to
purchase proprrty from plaintiff, which plaintiff had
acquired as the last of a series of transactons involving
the property, and the contract for which they were in
d(.. fault. That is, a situation substantially identical to
that in the instant case. The court said that:
''The effect of [the trial court's determination] was to recognize [defendant's] right to regard thr contract as breached by the [plaintiff]
and to justify her rrfnsal to perform."
The court might well find in this case that the hiatus
in rrspondents' payments was not "designed to avoid
a harg-ain regretted,'' nor even an absolute refusal to
perform, such as was found by the court to be justified
in Leavitt r. Rlolun. hut rather a mere attempt to avoid
making pay:men ts to
who possibly had no rights
'rith res1wct to the payments.
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The California Court of Appeals in Lloyd v. LockePaddon Land Co., (5 Cal. App. 2d 211, 42 P.2d 367)
(1953), examined the question, whether a seller who
permitted a foreclosure sale thereby committed such a
hreach as to relieve the buyer of his obligation to continue payments on the contract. The court said that the
purchasers' failure to continue payments "was a breach
of the contract . . . unless the mere permitting of the
foreclosure sale constituted a prior breach on the part
of appellants relieving respondent from his obligation
to continue such payments." The Court added,
"In the present case it was not alleged, nor
did it appear that the seller had done or suffered
any act prior to the def a ult of the purchaser
which rendered the seller incapable of performing
the contrart." And
"We do not wish to be understood as holding
that a purchaser must, in all cases, continue to
make his payments throughout the period of redemption where the seller has permitted the property to be sold under foreclosure. Such a rule
would no doubt work a hardship in cases where
the seller, due to insolvency or other cause, is
wholly incapable of performing on a contract even
upon a tender by the purchaser."
Appellants' reliance on this case is misplaced for the
reason that the plaintiff-purchaser in the cit<:•d case was
attempting to recover payments made to a conditional
vendor, ·whereas in the instant case the appellant-vendor
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is attempting to forcelose. In Lloyd, supra, the vendee
Pntered into a contract with the vendor at a time when the
vendor was not in defa ult. When the vendor defaulted
such that a foreclosure action was initiated against him,
the vendee stopped making payments, and never did
re-commence making payments. The effect of the vendee's failure or refusal to continue making payments
after the default was a disavowal or abrogation of the
contract. Having put himself in the best possible posture, free from further liability, free from further expense, he then attempted to recoup sums paid under a
valid, good-faith contract.
Respondents (Sellars) have shown no such duplicity.
Having contracted, bonafide on their part for the purchase of a home, they became understandably apprehensive about their home and investment when they were
served with documents aimed at foreclosing their vendor's right and interest in the property. Respondents
stopped making payments to Appellants (Blomquist).
But, and this is the telling factor, they resumed payments to a receiver well witl1in the period within which
appellants (Blomquist) might have redeemed. Respondents (Sellars) did not seek to avoid the contract; they
did not cast off their obligations; they did not act in
had faith at any time herein.
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POINT 2
APPELLANTS' FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO RESPONDENTS THEIR THEN EXISTING DEFAULT
ON THE MORTGAGE GIVEN TO AMERICAN SAVINGS &

LO AN ASSOCIATION

CONSTITUTED

FRAUD AND WILFUL DEFAULT JUSTIFYING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DISMISSING APPELLANTS' CLAIM

FOR

FAILURE

TO

STATE

A

CAUSE OF ACTION.

Elder v. Clausen, 14 U.2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963),
was an action to rescind a contract for the sale of farm
land which was under quarantine the vendor had failed
to give the vendee. The court concluded "that here
there was a suppression of the truth, which the party
with superior knowledge had a duty to disclose, which
amounted to fraud.
'One of the fundamental tenants of the Anglo-American Law of Fraud is that fraud mav be committed hy
the suppression of the truth . . . as well as the suggestion of falsehood .... '
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain facts is a factor determining that a duty of disclosure is owing. There is much authority to tlw effect
that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior
knowledge or knowledge that is not within the fair and
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reasonable reach of the other party, and which he could
not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or
means of knowledge which are not open to both the parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak, and his
silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other party
relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of
facts to enable him to judge of the expediency of the
Largain." This case, of course, deals with the quality
of the property in qurstion; the relief sought was rescission. In the Eldr:r case, the vendees had had no
experience in farming or ranching: they relied on the
representations of the vendor, who did have such experjence, that the noxious weeds could be easily destroyed
and presented no problem. In this case Respondents
(Sellars), a mechanic and house\vife, relied on the representations of appPllant (Blomquist), an experienced inV('Stment and real estate broker, that Respondents (Sellars) did not need the advice of an attornPy as they had
proposed, since he (Blomquist) was fully qualified and
0xperienced in such matters, to disclose to respondents
thefact that respondents nught, as a result of the fore<'losure artion, have no tjtle to convey to respondents
regardless of whether or not resopnd0nts had tendered
the full purchase price. In addition, appellants executed
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract a provision whereby appellants covenanted and agreed that there were

no assesf'ments against tlie prop0rty, and that they would
not default in the paymPnt of their obligations against
tLe propPrty. Appellants lrne\Y at that time, and were
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obligated to so inform the respondents, that they were
in default on their mortgage, and in danger of foreclosure.
POINT 3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING RESPONDENTS' CLAIM AS FAILING TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE RESPONDENTS
HAD SUSPENDED PAYMENTS FOLLOWING DISCOVERY OF APPELLANTS DEFAULT AND RESUMED PAYMENTS TO A COURT APPOINTED
RECEIVER.

This court,
ported the
discontinue
vendor had
said:

in Leavitt v. Blohrn, supra, strongly supright of a vendee to at least temporarily
making payments where the actions of the
jeopardized the vendee's equity. The court

"It is to be kept in mind that the obligations
of such contracts run both ways. It is true that
if the buyer fails to make his payments he can not
enforce his rights. By the same token, if the
seller fails to meet his commitments, he likewise
can not expect the buyer to perform. An important attribute of the mvnership of real properly, ... [is] the right of the quiet and peaceable
enjoyment of it. She (the vendee) had a right
to look to [the vendors] not to leave her vulnerable to being disturl>ed therein. Her responsibil-
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ity to make payments to them was dependent
upon their fulfillment of this duty to her. . . .
The [vendee] knew that unless the [vendors]
made the payments she was exposed to the risk
of a judgment in the suit by the vendors' mortgage."
Respondents ceased making payments to appellants
only when it was apparent that their title was in extreme
danger owing to appellants' default on the mortgage;
they resumed making payments when the court appointed
a receiver; respondents' suit was grounded on the fear
that their efforts and expenditures would be irrevocably
lost to an insolvent seller who would be ultimately unable
to convey any title at all. Respondents have not even
sought recision to avoid the contract; their good faith is
further shown by their resumtpion of payments to a
court-appointed receiver upon whose integrity, regarding distribution of the moneys paid him, they knew they
rould rely.

coNcLrsrox
Respondents respectfully submit that the trial court
rorrectly dismissed appellants' claim for failure to state
a claim upon ''Thich reliPf could he granted, in light of
the fact that appellants entered into the contract of sale
with full knowledge that their own mortgage on the same
property was in default, and of the fact that the subse(jlWnt for0closure of that mortgage deprived them of
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any title or right which they might convey; that the
trial court erred in dismissing respondents' claim for
failure to state a claim upon \vhich relief might be
granted, in light of the fact that the Uniform Real Estate Contract executed by and between respondents and
appellants had been breached hy appellants even at the
moment of execution thereof, and at least, prior to the
time respondents discontinued making payments directly
to appellants. Respondents are entitled to a judgment
reversing the dismissal of respondents' claim and for a
trial to determine the question of damages.
Respectfully submitted,
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE &
CORNE
1010 University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for the Respondent
and Cross-Appellant

